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Introduction
The genesis of Mercosur, in the 1980s, dates back to Brazil and 
Argentina´s bilateral efforts to institutionalize the pillars to create a common 
market that, based on sectorial protocols of gradual and symmetrical 
industrial cooperation, would contribute to economic development and a 
non-subordinate insertion of both countries in the international system. In 
the 1990s, the capitalist restructuring and offensive in the midst of the strong 
economic crises that hit countries, in addition to the rise of the new neoliberal 
governments in the Southern Cone as a whole, guided a reorientation of 
the bilateral integration policy that, pairing with Uruguay and Paraguay, 
originated Mercosur.
In accordance with the guidelines of the Uruguay Round of the 
old General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 1947 and with the new 
integration strategy for Latin America defined by the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in terms of open regionalism, 
the integration model based on an integration based on development and 
autonomy initially adopted by Brazil and Argentina, was replaced by an open 
integration to the markets, placing commercial liberalization and financial 
deregulation as the dynamic axes of the association process. Thus, during 
the 90s, a “Mercosur for business” came into effect, in the words of Katz 
(2006), also emblematically called by Caetano (2007) “Phoenician Mercosur”, 
restricted to an economic-commercial agenda.
In the 2000s, in the context of the neoliberal hegemony crisis and 
in a favorable external conjuncture, linked not only to the resumption of 
world growth, but also due to the Chinese rise to the status of an economic 
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and political power at the global level, the emergence of new popular and 
progressive governments in South America marked a change in the pathways 
of integration in the region, which started to be guided by a multidimensional 
perspective. Unlike the model based on open regionalism, this new 
integrationist perspective, crystallized in the Buenos Aires Consensus of 2003, 
signed by the representatives of Brazil and Argentina at the time, proposed 
an expanded arrangement for the coordination of member states in matters 
of public policy, not solely of economic-commercial, but also of a productive, 
political and social nature.
However, after the global economic and financial crisis of 2008 and 
the end of the “commodities cycle”, the change in the correlation of forces, 
expressed in the “left turn” of the first decade of 2000, gave way under the 
pressure of the dominant classes, that deemed the political-economic model 
of supporting these progressive governments to be exhausted. This pressure 
culminated in a political scenario marked by a “turn to the right”, which had 
as a central feature the resumption of conservative neoliberal ideas. Starting 
in 2011, resuming the model of open regionalism, the political action has 
sought to mirror initiatives such as the Pacific Alliance - guided by the 
indiscriminate establishment of free trade agreements -, in disregard of the 
initiatives promoted in the previous decade. From this brief contextualization 
and regaining the understanding of Guimarães (2002, 119) that “for the great 
states of the periphery, the formation of economic and political blocs is one of 
the most important phenomena on the international scene”, we seek in this 
work to present some interpretative notes, in a historical and institutional 
perspective, in order to provide subsidies for an assessment of Mercosur, in 
its three decades of operation2.
Regarding the organization of the article, in addition to this 
introduction, the present work will have three sections, corresponding to each 
of the decades that Mercosur has gone through to the present moment. The 
first section presents the first decade of the bloc’s evolution since its creation 
in 1991. The second section discusses the innovations that the second decade, 
particularly since 2003, brought to Mercosur. In the third and last section, 
the main changes and trends of the last ten years of the bloc are addressed, 
which point to Mercosur precarious conditions. Finally, we will formulate 
some conclusions.
2 We would like to thank Guilherme Bratz Uberti for reading and commenting on an earlier 
version of this text.
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The Phoenician Mercosur (1991-2001)
 
The genesis of Mercosur relates to the bilateral integration initiatives 
of Brazil and Argentina in the mid-1980s, in a context of acute economic 
crises and the resumption of the democratic system of government in the 
Southern Cone3. In 1985 both countries signed the Declaration of Iguaçu, 
which marked a turning point in the bilateral relationship, as well as from the 
point of view of integration itself, enabling a political understanding that was 
reflected in the text of the Buenos Aires Act for Argentine-Brazilian Integration 
of 1986. Thus, both countries created, through the Economic Cooperation and 
Integration Program (1986-1988) and the 1988 Integration, Cooperation and 
Development Treaty, the bases for the gradual creation of a common market4 
that would contribute to economic development - through sectoral protocols 
of inter-industrial coordination5 - and to increase the negotiation capacities in 
the international arena. It is interesting to mention that, although the focus 
of integration, during this period, was in the economic aspect, other issues 
of government policy that demonstrate the breadth of the integration project 
were not left out, as well as the idea of development in these countries, where 
the economic was only one aspect of an even wider spectrum6.
With the objective of giving a regional projection to the bilateral 
commitments assumed, since the mid-1980s, by Brazil and Argentina, on 
March 26, 1991, the governments of both countries signed, in Asunción, 
together with those of Paraguay and Uruguay7, the Treaty for the Constitution 
of MERCOSUR8, which governed the conditions for the transition to a 
3 See Rapoport & Cervo (2002); Bandeira (1987).
4 Bearing in mind that, according to the classical theory of economic integration, the possible 
degrees or alternatives in the matter are the free trade area, the customs union, the common 
market, the economic union and the total economic integration. For additional information, 
see Balassa (1961).
5 See Lavagna (1998).
6 In fact, among the various themes that were the subject of specific protocols, we can mention 
energy, biotechnology, land and maritime transport, communications, nuclear cooperation, 
culture, public administration. See Granato (2015).
7 Uruguay’s participation in the integration process had been the subject of continuous talks 
since the mid-1980s, through several high-level meetings between Uruguayan, Argentine and 
Brazilian authorities, and even through bilateral agreements such as the Argentine-Uruguayan 
Economic Cooperation Agreement and the Brazil-Uruguay Commercial Expansion Program. 
However, Paraguay did not participate in talks prior to the formation of Mercosur until the end 
of the military dictatorship of Alfredo Stroessner, in 1989.
8 Economic Complementation Agreement n. 18, according to the terminology of the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA/ALADI).
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common market to be formed between the four countries by the date of 
December 31, 1994. The referred transition would be made, according to 
the letter the agreement itself, based on a progressive, linear and automatic 
program of trade liberalization; the elimination of non-tariff barriers; the 
gradual dismantling of the lists of exceptions in the previously mention 
liberalization program; commitments to move forward in the coordination of 
macroeconomic policies; the intention to develop a common external tariff; the 
coordination of positions in regional and international commercial economic 
forums, as well as the harmonization of national laws on various topics in 
order to facilitate business and the free movement of goods and productive 
factors. Thus, the dismantling of trade barriers became the central objective 
of the integration process, replacing compliance with the sectoral protocols 
of the original program of Brazil and Argentina, which emphasized inter-
industrial integration as a strategy for development and autonomy. From that 
moment on, the objective of the integration process would no longer be the 
protection of national economies in the midst of a take-off and diversification 
process, but to use the regional market to enhance comparative advantages, 
transforming it into the platform for the insertion of both countries in the 
international economy (Rapoport 2009; Ferrer 2006).
To achieve the fulfillment of its objectives, the Treaty of Asunción 
provided for a minimum institutional structure, in charge of the administration 
and implementation of the Treaty, as well as of the specific agreements and 
decisions that would be adopted during the transition period. The low degree 
of institutionalization was based on the fact that the negotiations could be 
defined, in a centralized way, by the heads of the Executive Branch of the 
member countries9, excluding the possibility of adopting, as in European 
integration, common institutions capable of executing their resolutions 
directly in the territory of those countries, and that could compromise the 
room for maneuver of the governments of each country. In this way, the 
national Executive Powers that presided over the negotiations in the scope of 
integration also took the decisions of domestic and foreign policy, formulated 
at the time in the light of the guidelines for the reduction of the public 
machinery and the commercial liberalization of the prevailing neoliberal 
model, enshrined in the prescription of the Washington consensus10.
In this period of transition towards the customs union, a stage prior to 
the establishment of the common market, the Trade Liberalization Program 
9 Indeed, the institutional structure did not provide for the participation of parliamentarians, 
who mobilized for the maintenance of the Joint Parliamentary Commission, originally foreseen 
in the aforementioned Treaty on Integration, Cooperation and Development of 1988.
10 See Williamson (1990).
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was set in motion, as established in the Treaty of Asunción, and negotiations 
for the approval of the Common External Tariff (CEF) were initiated, an 
instrument that seeks to ensure that the tariffs that are paid for the import 
of a given product are the same in all integrated countries, as well as being 
charged only once.
After the transition stage, in 1995, a new phase in the evolution of 
the Mercosur bloc began, which, due to the exponential increase in intra-bloc 
trade flows, Bouzas (2001) called it the “golden age for markets”. In fact, it 
was in the same year of 1995 that the CEF reached 85% of the commercial 
interchange, allowing to proceed with the constitution of the customs union, as 
foreseen in the Program of Action of Mercosur until the year 2000, approved 
by the Council of the Common Market (Conselho do Mercado Comum, CMC)11, 
as stated in Decision no. 09/1995. Once reading this Program, there is no 
doubt that the strategic objective envisioned for Mercosur was to deepen 
integration in a context of open regionalism12. In institutional terms, there 
were also important advances, having been signed the Additional Protocol to 
the Treaty of Asunción on the Institutional Structure of Mercosur, commonly 
known as the “Ouro Preto Protocol”, which established the legal personality of 
Mercosur, institutionalizing its definitive organs, and determined the dispute 
settlement system.
Despite its objectives being restricted to the economic-commercial 
plan, between 1995 and 1998 Mercosur also took important steps concerning 
the strengthening of democracy and the creation of a peace community in the 
region. For example, in 1996, facing the attempted coup d’état in Paraguay, 
the Presidential Declaration on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur, also 
known as the “Democratic Clause”, was signed, and the Political Consultation 
and Consultation Mechanism was created. In the same vein, in 1998, the 
Ushuaia Protocol on Democratic Commitment in Mercosur, Bolivia and 
Chile was signed, which incorporated the aforementioned Clause into the 
11 The regulations cited here were obtained from the Mercosur Secretariat website (http://
www.mercosur.int). Special reference will be made to the Decisions of the CMC, the highest 
body of the bloc, charged with the political conduct of the integration process, as well as the 
Resolutions or Recommendations of the Common Market Group (Grupo do Mercado Comum, 
GMC), the bloc’s executive body.
12 The process that arises when reconciling the interdependence arising from special 
preferential agreements and that driven by market signals resulting from trade liberalization 
in general was called “open regionalism”. In 1994, the ECLAC explicitly applied the concept 
of open regionalism to the Latin American context, through the discourse of serving for 
productive transformation with equity (Cepal 1994; Fuentes 1994). In this way, the idea of an 
integration that worked as a complement to the policies of trade opening aimed at promoting 
a better insertion of Latin American countries in the international economy was promoted. 
On the paradigms of regional integration in Latin America, see also Granato & Batista (2017).
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bloc’s legal acquis, strengthening the idea of democracy as a fundamental 
constitutive value. In addition, there are other achievements related to the 
actions of Mercosul Educativo to enhance the collaboration and coordination of 
policies, to the social-labor dimension (with the creation of the Economic and 
Social Consultative Forum13 and the approval of the 1998 Mercosur Social-
Labor Declaration) and the transit of persons, understood from the point of 
view of labor migrations14.
A last stage of the first decade of Mercosur could be identified between 
the years 1998 and 2002, and its most striking feature is the crisis that will 
occur as a result of a decrease in trade exchanges and an increase in conflicts 
and commercial disputes between Argentina and Brazil. These years, which 
began with the devaluation of the Real (BRL) in Brazil and continued with the 
worsening of the economic, political and social crisis in Argentina, resulted in 
a widespread perception that Mercosur had reached its limit. However, in an 
attempt to rescue the block from the “waiting game” in which it was inserted, 
in the year 2000 the so-called “Mercosur Relaunch” was approved, which 
included issues related to regulations, institutional performance, dispute 
settlement, CEF, investments, macroeconomic coordination, and external 
negotiations15. With regard to this last aspect, that of external negotiations, by 
means of the Decision no. 32/00, the CMC reaffirmed the bloc’s commitment 
to negotiate, jointly, commercial agreements with third countries or blocks 
from non-block countries in which tariff preferences would be granted. These 
aspects are fundamental pillars of the bloc’s journey towards the creation of a 
true common market. However, despite the aforementioned relaunch, efforts 
to recover the Mercosur space - to recompose the Mercosur´s identity bloc -, 
only gained renewed momentum from 2003 onwards.
13 The creation, through the Ouro Preto Protocol, of the aforementioned Forum, as a space 
to gather capital and labor, aimed at preparing the conditions for the future validity of the 
common market, in which the free circulation of productive factors was foreseen. The work 
factor would be represented, within the bloc, by its class organizations - the unions and union 
centrals.
14 In addition, over the period 1991 to 1999, meetings of ministers as bodies of the institutional 
structure were created, referring to non-commercial topics, such as education, justice, work, 
agriculture, culture, health, interior and industry. Protocols were also signed on the topics 
of cooperation and consular and jurisdictional assistance, responsibility arising from traffic 
accidents, cultural integration, social security and regional security. Although the themes of 
the meetings of ministers and protocols did not explicitly refer to trade issues, it is important 
to mention that, from the point of view of political conduct, these themes were, in fact, part 
of the greater objective of intensifying the integration process towards the common market.





The South American progressive agenda of the beginning of the 21st 
century had a significant impact on the integration represented by Mercosur, 
mainly with regard to the expansion of the bloc beyond the themes of 
economic-commercial policy, in a genre of multidimensional regionalism. As 
a counterpoint to the ideals of the Washington Consensus of the 1990s, which 
provided the framework in which the bloc adjusted itself from the beginning, 
the new governments of Brazil and Argentina signed, in October 2003, the 
Buenos Aires Consensus, through which they renewed their commitment 
to deepen Mercosur by working towards the improvement of its commercial 
institutions, the incorporation of new themes and countries, as well as the 
promotion of balanced agreements. Thus, even without breaking with the 
economic-commercial dimension of the paradigm of open regionalism16, as 
well as in the context of the conditions arising from dependent capitalism17, 
one must recognize the novelty of the Argentine-Brazilian proposal for the 
reformulation of the bloc18.
On the occasion of the Mercosur Summit Meeting that took place in 
Asunción in December 2003, the “Objective 2006” was approved, which 
presented a Work Program for the 2004-2006 biennium that included, in 
addition to the classic economic-commercial dimension that marked the bloc 
from the beginning, also the political dimension, the social dimension and 
other themes for a “new agenda”19. In this way, the path was opened to advance 
not only in the improvement of the customs union, an original objective of the 
Treaty of Asunción, but in the creation of an expanded space for productive, 
political and social integration, or one, in Lima & Coutinho’s terms (2008), 
“modern integration”. Thus, through the aforementioned Work Program 
2004-2006, new topics were included in the Mercosur agenda, which formed 
16 In fact, the significant commercial orientation of the bloc continued to prevail. Alongside 
this idea, Porta (2015) understands that the “utopia” of the so-called “Productive and Social 
Mercosur” (Mercosul Social e Produtivo) continued to be limited by the commercial Mercosur. 
According to the author, such a utopia “is trapped, scared and, finally, stopped by the ‘ghost’ 
of the commercial Mercosur; the transition between one phase and another has proved to be 
much more complex than it initially seemed and, in particular, than the harmony and political 
fineness of the Mercosur governments in recent years seemed to announce ”(Porta 2015, 105, 
free translation). Works such as those by Rios & Veiga (2007) and Riggirozzi & Tussie (2012) 
argue that it is possible to conceive of the model adopted in this period as a break with open 
regionalism. In Granato (2020) and Cavalcanti & Granato (2020) dispute this argument.
17 See Constantino & Cantamutto (2018).
18 For more information, see Granato (2015).
19 Check the  Decisão CMC n. 26/2003.
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the basis on which the integration process sought to be articulated in this 
second decade of operation.
In the period in question - where intra-bloc trade grew significantly, 
including in relation to the growth of world trade -, with the objective of 
advancing the improvement of the customs union, through the Decision n. 
54/2004, the CMC established the need to eliminate the double taxation of 
the CET, to establish a mechanism for the distribution of customs income and 
to adopt a Common Customs Code. In addition, the aforementioned Council 
determined that the implementation of the objectives should be gradual. 
Thus, a first stage in the evolution of Mercosur in this new decade is linked 
to the CMC Decision n. 37/2005, in force since 2006, which eliminated the 
double charge of the CET for goods imported from third countries that enter 
the territory of any of the States Parties. In a second stage, the interconnection 
of the national customs information systems was completed, through the 
Customs Records Information Exchange System, through CMC Decision n. 
10/2010, in which the “Guidelines for implementing the Common External 
Tariff double taxation and redistribution of duty taxes” was approved. For its 
turn, it is worth mentioning that, through the CMC Decision n. 27/2010, 
the Mercosur Customs Code was approved - a fundamental rule for the 
consolidation of the customs union, which is still, ten years later, awaiting the 
incorporation by Paraguay and Uruguay20.
Added to the customs issue, in this period, the understanding that new 
themes (such as productive integration and the treatment of asymmetries) 
should occupy a prominent place on the bloc’s agenda was established. 
Initially, productive integration acquired a central place on the agendas of 
the Mercosur Summit, which took place in the city of Córdoba, Argentina, 
in July 2006, and of the Mercosur Social Summit in Brasilia21, in December 
2006. The official statements that emerged from these bodies reflected the 
commitment to a regional productive integration project, with an emphasis on 
the development of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) production chains, 
and on the participation of companies from the least developed countries. 
For these purposes, the ministers of the respective areas were instructed to 
20 This reflects one of the major problems that historically the bloc has been confronted with: 
the serious deficit in the process of incorporating regional regulations into the internal legal 
systems of member states into effective law.
21 It should be noted that, as of 2006, the so-called “Social Summits”, organized by the focal 
points of the Somos Mercosul Program, have become a regular event on the bloc’s official 
agenda. Considering it convenient to ensure the periodicity of the Social Summit, as well as 
its connection with the bodies of the institutional structure of Mercosur, the CMC, through 




develop a Regional Productive Development and Integration Plan.
Thus, while in 2007 there was a deepening of awareness about 
the need to develop a productive integration program that would promote 
the development of regional value chains and the competitiveness and 
complementarity of SMEs, in 2008, there was a steady progress with 
the creation of the Productive Integration Program of Mercosur and the 
Productive Integration Group, as well as the Mercosur Fund to Support SMEs, 
adopted through the CMC Decisions n. 12 and 13, of that year, respectively. 
The aforementioned Productive Integration Program aimed to strengthen 
the productive complementation of the bloc’s companies (with emphasis 
on SMEs) and to increase the competitiveness of different sectors of the 
States parties22. However, despite this Program, the articulation of common 
industrial policies, challenging the traditional model of dependency in the 
central countries, remains, even today, in general, a pending issue in the 
bloc23.
Since 2003, the issue of asymmetries within Mercosur has been treated 
in a more consistent manner24. In fact, at the December 2003 Mercosur 
Summit Meeting, at which the 2004-2006 Work Program was approved, they 
also approved the CMC Decision n. 03/27, which determined the realization 
of studies for the establishment, in Mercosur, of Structural Funds destined 
to increase the competitiveness of the smaller partners and of those less 
developed regions. Therefore, the process that would achieve the creation of 
the Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (Focem) begun.
So, with the objectives of promoting structural convergence, 
developing competitiveness, favoring social cohesion - in particular for smaller 
economies and less developed regions -, and improving the institutionality 
of the bloc, the CMC created, through Decisions n. 45/2004 and 18/2005, 
22 We cannot fail to mention an issue linked to the productive integration and strengthening of 
the competitiveness of the bloc’s productive sectors: the one related to science and technology. 
In this sense, we should highlight the approval on June 30, 2008, through CMC Decision n. 
03, of the Mercosur Science, Technology and Innovation Framework Program for the period 
2008-2012, with the mission of promoting the generation, application, socialization and 
awareness of scientific and technological knowledge, of great importance for the construction 
of endogenous and sovereign development.
23 For more information regarding the specific case of the Mercosur automotive chain, see 
Treacy (2021).
24 Although the way of dealing with asymmetries has been present in the Mercosur debate 
since its beginning, in practical terms, the Treaty of Asunción avoided any reference to 
regional policies aimed at compensating for structural asymmetries, and simply limited itself 
to recognize, through its Article 6, “specific rhythm differentials” of trade liberalization for 
Paraguay and Uruguay. See Granato (2016).
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the Focem, designed to finance four programs to be developed based on the 
mentioned objectives. According to the aforementioned regulations, the first 
Program includes projects that contribute to the development and structural 
adjustment of smaller economies and less developed regions, including the 
improvement of border integration systems and communication systems 
in general. The second Program, of Competitiveness Development, is the 
broadest, and includes projects that contribute to competitiveness within the 
scope of Mercosur, including projects that facilitate the creation of intra-bloc 
trade, that favor the integration of productive chains, and that strengthen the 
public and private  institutionality in aspects related to quality in production 
(technical standards, certification, animals and plants health control, etc.), as 
well as research and development of new products and production processes. 
The third program includes projects that contribute to social development, 
particularly in border areas, and may include projects of community interest 
in areas of human health, poverty reduction and unemployment. The last 
program includes projects aimed at improving the institutional structure of 
Mercosur and its eventual development.
With a clear compensatory and redistributive sense in favor of the 
poorest countries, in view of the historical average of the gross domestic 
product of Mercosur, 70% of the annual non-reimbursable contributions from 
the Fund must come from Brazil, 27% from Argentina, 2% from Uruguay 
and 1% of Paraguay. In turn, Paraguay is the recipient of 48% of Focem’s 
resources, and Uruguay receives 32% of the total. Brazil and Argentina 
receive 10% of the resources each, that is, the funds should be financed by 
asymmetric contributions and the allocation of their resources should benefit 
the smaller states. In practical terms, although Focem has been, until now, 
mostly determined by short-term issues25, instead of being guided by a long-
term sustainable strategy to reduce real disparities, one must recognize the 
pioneering nature of this attempt to face the national and social asymmetries 
and inequalities within each country, and the integration bloc as a whole, 
creating a positive precedent in community treatment for the problems 
affecting the region.
In terms of political integration, two issues deserve to be highlighted at 
this stage. The first of these concerns the expansion of the bloc to the rest of the 
region, strengthening, as Visentini (2013) points out, the possibility of strategic 
action, at the global level, which reverses the increasing marginalization 
25 It is worth mentioning, for example, the implementation of sanitation, housing, drinking 
water, rehabilitation of highways and railways, installation of electrical networks, among 
others. Currently, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, funds have also been earmarked to 
contribute for the fight against the Coronavirus.
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suffered by South America. In the period in question, Chile, Bolivia, Peru, 
Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela started to acquire the status of Associated 
States, due to the submission of the respective request to the CMC26. With 
regard to Venezuela and Bolivia in particular, through the Accession Protocols 
of 2006 and 2015, respectively, the incorporation of these countries as full 
members of the bloc was approved. In the case of Venezuela, the merger only 
took place in 2012, once ratifications by the congresses of the States parties 
had been made. Bolivia, on the other hand, still awaits the said ratifications, 
having reiterated at the Mercosur Summit Meeting in March 2021 - a meeting 
to which it appeared as an associate member - the willingness to be part of 
the bloc as a full member. The outlined framework shows the agglutinating 
impulse that marked Mercosur at the time, based on the understanding that 
a more comprehensive articulation and a good neighborhood policy would 
open up new possibilities for integration in strategic areas such as energy and 
infrastructure, mainly, as well as for building a certain strategic autonomy of 
the bloc on the periphery of world geopolitics27.
The second issue that deserves to be highlighted refers to the creation, 
in the period in question, of new institutional spheres, such as the Parliament 
of Mercosur (Parlasur), the Institute of Public Policies of Human Rights, the 
High Representation-General of Mercosur and the Unit of Support for Social 
Participation, which, although essentially consultative, challenged the original 
minimalist structure of the block28. Concerning the first body mentioned, after 
several negotiations, through the CMC Decision n. 23/2005, its Constitutive 
Protocol was approved, thus taking a step, albeit timid, to move towards the 
expansion of political representation, democratization and the legitimization 
of the Mercosur bloc. Despite the relevant competences attributed, such 
as that of ensuring compliance with Mercosur rules and the preservation 
of the democratic regime in the States parties, Parlasur has been given the 
status of a purely consultative body, devoid of decision-making, control or 
inspection powers29. The Institute for Public Policies on Human Rights, 
26 The picture is completed with Guyana and Suriname, that raised to this status only in 2013.
27 However, other links outside the region were also sought. Between 2006 and 2014, Mercosur 
sought to strengthen ties with other developing countries, signing agreements or memoranda 
of understanding with countries such as Morocco, Israel, Pakistan, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt, 
Palestine, Syria, India, Lebanon, Tunisia, Singapore and Korea do Sul. For more information, 
see Granato (2015).
28 On the challenges of Mercosur’s institutional reform in this second decade of operation, 
check Caetano, Vázquez & Ventura (2009).
29 Headquartered in the city of Montevideo, the body in question is made up of 318 
parliamentarians, who are divided by country according to population proportion, in such a 
way that Brazil is represented with 121 parliamentarians, Argentina with 81, Uruguay with 
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based in Buenos Aires, was created by the CMC Decision n. 14/2009, with 
the objective of contributing to the established in the Protocol of Assumption 
on Commitment to the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights of 
Mercosur of 2005, through the design and follow-up of public policies in the 
matter. In turn, recognizing the importance of having a body that contributes 
to the development and functioning of the integration process, starting from 
the strengthening of the capacities to produce proposals for regional policies 
and community management in several fundamental themes, through the 
Decision n. 63/2010, the CMC created the post of High Representative-
General of Mercosur, with the Brazilian diplomat Samuel Pinheiro 
Guimarães being the first to occupy this post, whose duties essentially aimed 
to meet the demands of deepening the bloc. Finally, through Decision no. 
65/2010, the Social Participation Support Unit was created within the scope 
of the aforementioned High Representation, with the purpose of acting as an 
institutional channel of dialogue with society and with social movements and 
organizations.
Finally, the renewal experienced by Mercosur, in this second decade 
of operation, also relates to the development of its social dimension. This 
characteristic distinguishes it from the Mercosur in the 1990s, centered on 
the economic-commercial aspect of integration. One of the most relevant 
achievements in this matter is the one represented by the Residence 
Agreement for Nationals of the States parties to the bloc, approved by the 
CMC Decision no. 28/2002, which simplifies the procedures for applying 
for residency. Although there was a great demonstration and mobilization of 
immigrant organizations and support for immigrants for its entry into force, 
this achievement only gradually became reality, being assumed bilaterally 
between Brazil and Argentina in 2005, with Uruguay in 2006 and finally 
for the whole bloc in November 2009, with the ratification of Paraguay, 
which until then had signed, but not concluded, the necessary procedures 
for its definitive validity. Similarly, the social security rights contained in the 
Multilateral Social Security Agreement, approved by the CMC Decision no. 
19/1997, which only came into force in 200530.
In terms of education, although the Mercosur Educational Sector has 
63, Paraguay with 30, and Venezuela with 23. Currently, the election for parliamentarians 
of Parlasul occurs indirectly in most member countries, with the exception of Paraguay and 
Argentina, which have already approved and internalized the rule that guarantees direct 
elections.
30 The aforementioned Agreement guarantees that social security rights are recognized 
for workers who render or have rendered services in any of the States parties, allowing the 
totalization of the periods of social security contribution and the implementation of the benefit.
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been operating since 1992, it was only in 2004 that, through Decision n. 
33, the Financing Fund for this Sector was created, which has been making 
it possible to make it operational, regarding the preparation of studies and 
formulation of measures. In addition to the various mechanisms related to 
the accreditation of courses and academic mobility, approved in this period, 
the referred Fund has shown itself to be an important factor, as already 
mentioned, for boosting, in general, regional education policy.
Last but not least, in terms of social development policy, it was created, 
in this period, through Decision n. 03/2007, the Social Institute of Mercosur, 
based in Asunción, with the objective of providing the bloc with a technical 
investigation body in the field of social policies and the implementation 
of strategic lines, betting on the consolidation of the social dimension as a 
central axis in the Mercosur integration process. In convergence with this 
great objective, in 2010, the CMC approved, by means of the Decisions n. 64 
and 67, of December 16, an action plan for the progressive structuring of a 
Mercosur Citizenship Statute31, as well as a scheme for the preparation of the 
Mercosur Strategic Social Action Plan, respectively.
In short, as it was possible to see, in this second decade of the bloc’s 
operation, Mercosur was conceived beyond the economic-commercial 
dimension, to which it was restricted in the previous stage. This observation, 
as seen throughout this section, also represents one of the main differentials 
of the reconfiguration of the bloc.
The Trend Towards Mercosur´s Precariousness (2011-2021)
As of 2011 and with a new conservative turn taking shape in the 
region, Mercosur has also been experiencing gradual changes in relation to 
the previous decade. Between 2011 and 2016, there are still some institutional 
advances in social matters, which corroborate a shy attempt to continue the 
efforts to consolidate a broader multidimensional Mercosur, as envisioned 
in the previous stage. As of 2016, in the context of “an aggressive strategy 
to resume the hegemony of the system, which results lead to a process of 
the dismantling of the South American states through the immediate return 
31 According to the aforementioned norms, the referred Statute will be integrated by a set of 
fundamental rights and benefits for the citizens of the member States of the bloc, and will 
be structured on the basis of the implementation of: a) a policy of free movement of people 
in the region; b) Equal civil, social, cultural and economic rights and freedoms for citizens of 
States Parties; c) equal conditions of access to work, health and education. Once the Statute 
was concluded, the text was presented at the March 2021 Summit, under the pro-tempore 
presidency of Argentina, and can be accessed through the official Mercosur website.
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of privatization policies and fiscal adjustment that are part of the neoliberal 
agenda” (Sarti 2017, 102), it is possible to verify that the return to the model 
of classic open regionalism gained a clearer frame.
Some of the main achievements that, since 2011, allowed the ongoing 
development of Mercosur´s new social dimension, characteristic of the 
renewal efforts of the previous decade, were in the area of social, educational, 
transport and labor policies. Due to the Decision no. 12/2011, the Mercosur 
Strategic Social Action Plan was approved, with the purpose of articulating and 
developing specific, integral and intersectoral actions that would consolidate 
the social dimension in the bloc with a commitment to combat inequalities and 
promote social inclusion32. In turn, aiming at the improvement, enlargement 
and articulation of academic mobility initiatives in education, the Mercosur 
Integrated Mobility System was created by Decision n. 36/2012, considering 
students and teachers for undergraduate courses and the development of 
joint research between graduate programs.
Regarding the transport theme, the Mercosur Common Vehicle 
Identification Plate was approved by the GMC Resolution no. 33/2014, and 
became mandatory in member States for new vehicles since 2016. This 
measure aims to guarantee the free movement of vehicles, facilitate productive 
activities and, at the same time, fight cross-border crimes. Finally, in July 
2015, the new Mercosur Social and Labor Declaration was approved, which 
determines that states commit themselves to formulating and implementing 
active decent work policies, in consultation with the most representative 
organizations of employers and workers articulated with economic and social 
policies, in order to favor the generation of opportunities for occupation 
and income, to raise the living conditions of citizens, and to promote the 
sustainable development of the region. This agenda is completed with the 
CMC Decision n. 22, also from 2015, which approves the continuity of Focem, 
although Brazil, its largest contributor, has incurred, during the study period, 
in delays in the payment of its contributions.
The instruments previously exposed reflect, albeit in a timid way when 
compared to the number and scope of the initiatives of the previous decade, 
the concern of the bloc’s political conduct in maintaining and consolidating 
32 As mentioned in this plan, it is worth pointing out that the member States had established 
a priority  framework of axes, guidelines and objectives, which aim to eradicate hunger, poverty 
and combat social inequalities; guarantee human rights, provide humanitarian assistance and 
ethnic, racial and gender equality; universalize health; universalize education and eradicate 
illiteracy; valuing and promoting cultural diversity; guaranteeing productive inclusion; ensuring 
access to decent work and social security rights; promote environmental sustainability; and 




Mercosur’s social dimension. However, the resumption of the model of open 
regionalism was not expected, and the evidence that most clearly indicates 
this path is the recent ambition to “flexibilize” the CEF and to revoke the CMC 
Decision n. 32/00, actions to reduce the bloc’s institutional architecture, and, 
finally, the decision to suspend Venezuela from Mercosur. Whereas the goal 
of improving the bloc seems to better represent Mercosur´s political action 
in the past decade, at this stage, the term that best describes Mercosur´s 
“flexibilization” defended by some of the member states is  precariousness.
Regarding the first point, in this last decade in question, the significant 
decrease in intra-bloc trade - mainly due to the industrial crises in Brazil and 
Argentina, as well as a greater Chinese presence in the region -, and the 
mirroring trade integrations such as that of the Pacific Alliance33, put into 
question the pertinence of Mercosur´s to persist in the path of establishing 
a common market, or wonder if it would be more convenient to return to a 
more precarious stage as a simple free trade agreement, without CET, without 
joint negotiation rules with third countries and, fundamentally, without the 
objective of joint and articulated confrontation of the external vulnerability 
characteristic of the countries of the bloc. CMC Decision n. 32/00, which 
guarantees the aforementioned joint negotiation, has been discussed, for 
example, in recent years, as an obstacle to trade negotiations between the 
European Union (EU) and Mercosur34, at least until the signing of the 
interregional agreement on 28 June 2019, and is still awaiting ratification 
by national parliaments. Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay have positioned 
themselves, at different times, as favorable to the “flexibilization” of Mercosur, 
a euphemism that, as warns Barros (2021), aims, in a definitive way, to end 
the CET. Even though the CET has lost impulse due to the drop in commercial 
exchange in the period, it remains a key device to move towards deeper and 
more balanced agreements. In this sense, as Amorim (2011, 99) rightly points 
out, “the heart of Mercosur is the Common External Tariff [...] Historically, the 
33 See Merino (2017).
34 For example, as highlighted in Cavalcanti & Granato (2020), on a visit to Argentina in 
October 2016, Temer defended the flexibilization of Mercosur rules in order to formalize 
the EU-Mercosur Agreement, a position also supported by Macri. In fact, on the occasion of 
José Serra’s visit to Buenos Aires, in May 2016, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Macri 
government, Susana Malcorra, when referring to such an interregional agreement, indicated 
the need to “better” Mercosur, incorporating new disciplines in tune with the most modern 
integration processes. Serra also referred to the renewal of Mercosur to “correct what needs to 
be corrected” (corrigir o que precisa ser corrigido), referring specifically to the amendment to 
the CMC Decision no. 32/2000 and CET. Serra’s arguments were taken up in the Bolsonaro 
period, after the signing of the EU-Mercosur Agreement. On the policies of the Macri, Temer 
and Bolsonaro governments aimed at Mercosur, see Busso & Zeliovich (2016); Miranda (2019); 
Frenkel & Azzi (2021), respectively.
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agreements that generated integration were not just commercial: they were 
customs union agreements”.
Although, the ideological convergence between the Macri 
government, in Argentina, and the Temer and Bolsonaro governments, in 
Brazil, and, recently, between the latter and the Lacalle Pou government, in 
Uruguay, allowed the bloc’s flexibilization proposal to have appeared with 
more emphasis, it is also possible to affirm that such understanding is not 
unanimous in Mercosur, and a recent episode can exemplify it. At a meeting 
of the bloc’s national coordinators, held by videoconference in April 2020, the 
Argentine government, through its Chancellery, announced its withdrawal 
from future regional bloc negotiations regarding the free trade agreements 
envisaged with countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Lebanon, Canada 
and India. In a press release, the Argentine Chancellery also expressed that 
the uncertainty throughout the world and the very situation of the country’s 
economy advise the decision in question, but that it will, however, continue 
to monitor the progress of the Mercosur-European Union Agreement, 
“without entering in debates, for now, sterile”35. In that same communiqué, 
the Argentine government also reported that this decision differentiates it 
from the positions adopted by other states in the bloc, which seek, in the 
midst of the Covid-19 pandemic, to accelerate trade opening negotiations with 
other countries in the world. However, despite the position of the Fernández 
government, there has been a predominance of the classic concern that guided 
Mercosur since the beginning, which is none other than competitiveness, 
efficiency, the bloc’s insertion in international trade flows, especially in view 
of the demands of the global productive segmentation strategy adopted by 
transnational companies, the so-called “global value chains”, whose dynamics, 
according to the new hegemonic perspective, the Mercosurian bloc should be 
subject to and accommodate36.
With regard to the second point raised here, it seems clear that, in the 
last decade, the related measures to reduce the institutionality of the bloc led 
to the resumption of the neoliberal and entrepreneurship ideas, especially 
with regard to a reorientation of institutional architecture aimed at a bloc 
which must reaffirm its essentially commercial character37. In this sense, the 
35 See Argentina (2020).
36 The disagreements cited above were also present at the Mercosur Summit Meeting in 
March 2021.
37 In fact, as of 2016/2017, among the regulations that gained prominence in the bloc, we can 
mention the Cooperation and Facilitation Protocol for Intra-Mercosur Investments, approved 
by the CMC Decision no. 3/2017; the Mercosur Trade Facilitation Agreement, approved by the 
CMC Decision no. 29/2019 and the Mercosur Electronic Commerce Agreement, approved 
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CMC Decision n. 19/2019 is clear when establishing an action plan to review 
the institutional structure of Mercosur (2020-2021), “with a view to assessing 
its adequacy to the current stage of the integration process and making it 
leaner and more efficient, eliminating the double efforts”. The proposal to 
return to a minimalist Mercosur, with an adequate and efficient institutional 
structure guided by the bloc’s commercial objectives, was also reflected in the 
CMC Decisions ns. 6 and 30, 2017, in which  the post of High Representative-
General of Mercosur was removed, and the Social Participation Support Unit, 
devoid of the structure originally foreseen for the fulfillment of its objectives, 
became part of the structure of the Secretariat of Mercosur.
Finally, there is one last aspect that contributes to corroborate the 
paradigm shift in Mercosur. This aspect refers to the dismantling of the 
expansion of Mercosur to the rest of South America, in opposition to the basis 
in which this expansion sought to be privileged in the preceding decade, that 
is, in articulation with the premises of South-South cooperation, sovereignty 
and strategic autonomy. In this last decade analyzed, the decision to suspend 
Venezuela from the bloc, applicating the Montevideo Protocol on Commitment 
to Democracy in Mercosur of 201138, appears, in this larger context, as an 
element that questions the enlarged Mercosur model, assuming that other 
“more modern” initiatives, limited to free trade and focusing on global value 
chains, will, in fact, be more successful. 
Final Remarks
 As discussed throughout this work, regional integration is a political 
project of great relevance for states in the capitalist periphery such as the 
South American states, and, as such, it will always assume certain choices 
in terms of models or paradigms to be followed and implemented. There 
is no neutral regionalism, and the historical and institutional framework of 
Mercosur presented here corroborates this statement.
As any possibility of developing inter-industrial coordination and 
cooperation, as originally thought by Brazil and Argentina was abandoned, 
Mercosur was guided, in the 1990s, by an integration model open to the 
markets, with a minimal institutional structure that would achieve its objective 
ruled by the hegemonic neoliberal ideas of that time. Once under the rule of 
popular and progressive governments of the region, in the first decade of the 
through the CMC Decision no. 15/2020.
38 It should be mentioned that this instrument was also applied to suspend Paraguay in 2012, 
due to former President Lugo destitution.
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21st century, other thematic dimensions and countries were present in the 
Mercosur bloc, in an attempt to enlarge Mercosur under a perspective that 
had in its internal balance and external autonomy its central core .
Throughout this last decade of operation, in the midst of a conservative 
turn in the region, Mercosur has been following the path of precariousness 
and fragility. Despite the resumption of the modality of open regionalism, 
Mercosur today is no longer guided by the original objective of the Treaty 
of Asunción of establishing a common market. As evidenced in the recent 
discussions of the political authorities of the bloc’s countries, the proclamation 
of the “modernization” and “flexibilization” of the regional integration has 
been guided by the attempt to dismantle the, albeit imperfect, institutional 
and normative architecture built over twenty-five years of history, in the 
understanding that - in the terms of the defenders of that modernization 
themselves - the individual negotiation of free trade agreements would be a 
key factor for a successful insertion in the global value chains. Rescuing the 
legacy of previous agreements is necessary.
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Over its thirty-year existence, Mercosur has experienced several changes, which refer 
to the models of open regionalism and multidimensional regionalism. Based on this 
argument, we seek to present, in this work, some interpretative notes, in a historical 
and institutional perspective, in order to provide subsidies for a balance of the bloc, 
in its three decades of operation. Focusing on the internal institutional dynamics of 
Mercosul and using bibliographic and documentary research, this paper discusses 
the integration models adopted and the main measures associated with the respective 
models along the bloc’s trajectory. Its conclusion points out to the current trend of 
resuming open regionalism in the midst of Mercosur´s precarious condition.
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